And yet China has also need a Bismarck i

In 2005, could be seen in London in a major exhibition organized under the auspices of the Chinese Government a huge painting in the Jesuit style of the 18th century representing an endless parade of Ambassadors paying tribute to the Emperor of China. The message could not be more clear. "You as pay us tribute, soon." That opens the world exhibition in Shanghai, this soon has it happened

Coming to China for a visit as a "journey of reconciliation", the French President is to move closer to China at the moment where it appears to be evidence of "hubris" Beijing has no doubt the feeling today that the report of the forces in the world is faster switches still in his favour that he thought yesterday. Would Chinese confidence be transforming in excess of confidence

It is true that the French President has no chance, arriving in China in European turmoil. How to be counsel of a new multipolar monetary order when it is seen by Chinese interlocutors as the representative of a Europe weakened, full of doubts about its future and that counts more on China to boost its growth shy

2010 China's certainly cannot be compared to the Germany of Guillaume II. It is not a new rich power, but a country that finds the status that was hers to the beginning of the nineteenth century. And yet China has also need a Bismarck, i.e. of a statesman who know control the ambitions of his country and integrate the interests and emotions of the "rest of the world" and its Asian neighbors in particular.

For some, China behaves in Asia as yesterday was the United States in the world. With a certainly major difference: their vision of an "Asian unipolar world" is not a universal message accompanied. If China is "number one" in its area, it is simply to serve its interests and not to make the best Asia.

In international politics, the trust is an asset, overconfidence weakness, especially when it leads to a form of autism to another. This autism is reinforced by the existence in China of "layers of humiliation", the Boxer war to Japanese invasions, which are not yet exceeded and still less transcendées in a non-democratic society which seems to have hurt even more than the Russia to its history.

What is worrisome for some time in the behaviour of China are not both strategic developments such as the strengthening of its naval power or more generally increased its defence budget. "Capabilities create intentions," wrote Raymond Aron; Perhaps, but that China wants invade The growth of its military arsenal following that of its surpluses. China is given the means of its new international status. It use, it does not abuse (not yet) say some. What is disturbing however is the General behaviour of a country that combines cynicism, brutality and a sometimes disregard of all forms of international rules. Cyberterrorism is one of the greatest concern illustrations.

Industrial competition can become a new Wild West where the law of the strongest, the most clever and that which is submitted at least of controls is necessarily required. There must be limits to industrial espionage. The long-term Chinese creativity, key to the success of China, assumes the existence of the rule of law in the relationship of China with the world as well as in the relationship of China with itself.

There are two forms of nationalism in China: a is positive, responsible, knows how to make evidence of voluntary restraint and enrolled in the Chinese historical tradition. the other is aggressive, impulsive, and reflects the worst of a recent "Communist" tradition. Which of these two nationalisms prevail. It is now of the essence for the balance of Asia, but for that of the world.